Gulf of Tonkin: Missteps and Miscommunications.

The press functions to serve the public, to deliver information without bias, to dredge up the facts. But, as is always the case with any organization run by man, the press occasionally fails. In the instance of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, information was distorted and withheld from the public.  Failing at crisis management, President Johnson escalated a war based on two deliberate attacks on United States destroyers by north Vietnamese forces. The evidence was unsubstantiated, however, and by the time the information was sifted through and analyzed the press was too late to stop what would become a long and bloody war. The press failed to inform the nation properly of what was happening. Newspapers failed and failed again to find the facts. Instead, they placidly allied with and distributed the statements being released by the government, while failing to analyze the situation fully. But why such inaccurate coverage? Because the media relied almost exclusively on U.S. government officials as the sole source of information. “By reporting official claims as absolute truths, American journalism opened the floodgates for the bloody Vietnam War” (Solomon, Cohen).

“What conceivable misjudgment could cause the Asian Communist to launch an attack on the United States Navy in the international waters of the Golf of Tonkin?” The Tri City Herald, one of many U.S. newspapers covering the “attacks” in the gulf of Tonkin, began their story, “Why the Attacks By Reds In The Gulf Of Tonkin?” with this byline on August 9, 1964.

Recorded at the time as two deliberate attacks on U.S. ships, this incident catalyzed the United States’ declaration of war against Vietnam, one of the bloodiest and prolonged wars in this country’s history. Adhering to a strict containment policy regarding communism in the years following WWII, The United States committed its resources and attention to countries it considered threatened by the imposition of a communist regime. In the case of Vietnam, the U.S. installed Ngo Dinh Diem as the premier of South Vietnam in 1955, following a decision to separate Vietnam into two parts the previous year.  In the late 1950’s, however, a guerrilla war broke out between the “democratic” Vietnam and the communist insurgents. The United States responded with an influx of economical aid, equipment, and military advisers (Martel, 36).

On August 2, 1964, a U.S. destroyer, Maddox, an intelligence gathering ship cruising near the Hon Me Island was intercepted by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Reportedly, the Maddox fired the first shots. (Roberts, 211) Navy jets from a nearby carrier sank one of the assailing boats and damaged the other two, and the only reported contact was a single machine gun bullet that struck the Maddox. (Roberts, 209) President Johnson ordered a second destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, and the Maddox to continue patrolling, and on the 4th of August, a second incident occurred.

During the a dark night and a violent storm, turbulent enough to disrupt sonar, officers of both destroyers believed that they were under attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. “Questionable sonar readings suggested that many torpedoes might have been launched, but since no sightings of torpedoes or torpedo boats were confirmed, and since neither ship sustained any damage, evidence of an actual attack could not be established” (36, Martel).

Officers in the Pacific had doubts as to whether or not they had actually been attacked. Information from the Pacific to Washington was seemingly clear on that aspect of the matter.  “Captain Herrick, the patrol commander sent this message to Pacific headquarters: ‘Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful...Freak weather effects and over-eager sonar-man may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action.’” (Roberts, 214-215) This message was immediately relayed to Washington, but the one that followed, a message that gave all manner of reasons to doubt that that the attack occurred did not arrive until nearly twenty minutes after American planes had been dispatched toward their targets in North Vietnam (Roberts, 216).

Despite hesitation to point fingers by the Americans on the Pacific side of the situation, President Johnson believed the evidence of the attack substantial enough to order an attack on four North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and a major oil storage facility.  Johnson stated, "Repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight” (Martel, 37).

"American Planes Hit North Vietnam After Second Attack on Our Destroyers; Move Taken to Halt New Aggression", announced a Washington Post headline on Aug. 5, 1964. On the same day, the New York Times reported: "President Johnson has ordered retaliatory action against gunboats and 'certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam' after renewed attacks against American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin."

But there was no second attack. No evidence indicated that it had ever occurred. Yet, the newspapers latched on to Johnson’s statements. And the chasm between fact and reporting during The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, led to a wealth of misinformation and misguided military advances.  

Johnson alleged to the public through TV and radio broadcasts that there had in fact been a second “attack.” One attack would not have served as grounds to declare a war. It could have been deemed an isolated incident, but, with the addition of a second attack, the president was able to point to the, then, “trend” of aggression by North Vietnam toward the U.S. With stories of the attack flooding newspapers, public support for the war was easily accumulated in its beginning phases. “A pattern took hold: continuous government lies passed on by pliant mass media...leading to over 50,000 American deaths and millions of Vietnamese casualties” (Solomon, Cohen).

American appropriateness was an issue discussed by skeptical Americans and Europeans alike. Was the United States’ involvement legitimized? Was it worth the toll on American soldiers?  In later years, most would come to the conclusion that a second attack in the Gulf of Tonkin never occurred. And since, more information has surfaced in the years following the crisis. (Roberts, 214)

The sonar equipment and IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) equipment had broken down and been repaired on August 4, just before the second attack. Most agree now that the equipment had malfunctioned, leading the officers on the ships to believe they were being attacked. “In 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had no doubts about a second attack. After a trip to Vietnam in 1995, he announced that he was “absolutely positive” that the second attack had never taken place” (Fisher, 180)

It is easy to look back now and see the error and the shortcomings of the politicians and the press alike regarding the Gulf of Tonkin attacks. The lag time in the initial communication relaying the events appears to be an important key in the execution of the U.S.’s attack on North Vietnam. We hope that this sort of problem would most likely not exist today.

Many also believe that Washington was predisposed toward teaching North Korea a lesson and was simply looking for an excuse to pull the trigger. The war was supposed to be an exhibition of U.S. military strength. Many Europeans believe the situation epitomizes America’s tendency to overreact (Roberts, 210).

Learning a lesson from this historical event may be difficult in its application in 2011. Nearly three decades after the Vietnam War, during the Gulf War, columnist Sydney Schanberg warned journalists not to forget "our unquestioning chorus of agreeability when Lyndon Johnson bamboozled us with his fabrication of the Gulf of Tonkin incident" (Solomon, Cohen).

With faster and more accurate communications between Washington and the rest of the world, it’s difficult to imagine a similar situation occurring today.  If the lesson was to avoid unnecessary military action abroad, then the War in Iraq and Afghanistan would, hopefully, not have endured so long (or occurred at all).

Schanberg blamed not only the press but also "the apparent amnesia of the wider American public…We Americans are the ultimate innocents. We are forever desperate to believe that this time the government is telling us the truth" (Solomon, Cohen).

The Gulf of Tonkin incidents led to the first bombings of Vietnam, created the first use of the Washington hot line, influenced American Policies with the adaptation of the Tonkin Resolution, and exemplified the price of pro-war propaganda when perpetuated by a U.S. president. (Roberts, 210)

Works Cited

Cohen, Jeff and Solomon, Norman. “30-year Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie Launched

Vietnam War” Media Beat. July 1994.  http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2261

FISHER, LOUIS. "The Law: When Wars Begin: Misleading Statements by Presidents."

Presidential Studies Quarterly 40.1 (2010): 171-184. Historical Abstracts.

EBSCO. Web. 3 Oct. 2011.

Martel, Erich. OAH Magazine of History. Vol. 7, No. 2, History of U.S. Foreign Policy

(1992), pp. 36-39. Organization of American Historians.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25162875

Roberts, Adam. “The Fog of Crisis: The 1964 Gulf Incidents.” The World Today. Vol.

26, No. 5 (May, 1970), pp. 209-217. Royal Institute of International Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/40394379